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The implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights' is vitally important to the development of world pub-
lic order. The Covenant provides for establishment of a monitoring
body-the United Nations Human Rights Committee-which has
functioned since 1977 under article 40 of the Covenant and under the
Optional Protocol relating to the Right of Individual Petition.2 Al-
though the mandate of the Committee, as described in article 40 of the
Covenant, confers little specific enforcement power, the Committee has
developed tactful procedures for engaging States Parties in extensive
dialogue on their adherence to their treaty obligations.
3
Though it includes members from a wide variety of countries, the
Committee has managed to minimize the internal political conflicts
which often paralyze international bodies. Members have shown a
genuine dedication to the cause of human rights and to the promotion
of the Covenant's standards. In fact, the Committee has stretched both
its mandate and the substantive provisions of the Covenant as far as it
practically can.
What, if anything, can the Committee do to curb violations of the
Covenant? What has it done so far? Specifically, how has the Commit-
tee handled violations of the rights specified in article 4, paragraph 2 of
the Covenant, rights which are non-derogable even in times of public
emergencies? The answer should be twofold: the Committee has done
little because the Covenant leaves it little or no room for active interfer-
ence; but, at the same time, it has done much because it has used its
mandate in an effective way, and it is continually developing proce-
dures to review States Parties' observance of the Covenant.
This paper focuses on the Covenant's definition of public emergency,
t Member, Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations.
1. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter International Covenant]. The Covenant and accompanying Optional Protocol
were concluded and adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966.
2. Id
3. For an overview of the first five years of the Committee, see Fisher, Reporting under
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: the First Five Years of the Human Rights Commit-
tee, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 142-53 (1982).
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and how the Committee has dealt with the four situations in which
States Parties have declared such emergencies. Finally, the paper dis-
cusses the special procedures the Committee plans to establish to en-
able it to respond in a more timely fashion and more effectively to
declared public emergencies.
I. Article 4 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The drafters of the Covenant anticipated circumstances in which it
would be difficult to require States Parties to guarantee all the rights
enumerated in the Covenant. In abnormal situations, the restoration of
"normalcy" might require the temporary suspension of certain rights.
Such suspension would be justified because the rights of all individuals
under the jurisdiction of a given state would be in jeopardy, and be-
cause the suspension of certain rights would facilitate the restoration of
public order. The stability achieved thereby would fully guarantee all
human rights. On the other hand, the drafters foresaw that a general
exemption clause would easily lead to abuses. The clause, therefore,
was to be carefully drafted to specify the conditions under which dero-
gations would be allowed.
Article 4, paragraph 1, provides that States Parties may "take meas-
ures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant" in
"time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed."' 4 The decision whether
to exercise this power-i.e. the assessment of the situation as a state of
public emergency-lies within the State Party's discretion. If a State
Party chooses to use this power, it is bound by a series of formal re-
quirements and substantive limitations which may be summarized as
follows. The public emergency must: (a) threaten the life of the na-
4. International Covenant, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 1. Article 4 of the Covenant states:
I. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence
of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social
origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be
made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation
shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further commu-
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tion; and (b) be officially proclaimed. Derogating measures are only
considered lawful: (c) to the extent that they are strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation; (d) if they are not inconsistent with other
obligations of the State Party under international law; and (e) if they do
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion or social origin.5 Moreover, (f) any State Party "avail-
ing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other
States Parties to the Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has
derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated;" and (g) no
derogation may be made from certain articles containing rights and
freedoms so fundamental that they should be ensured under all
circumstances. 6
Article 4, paragraph 2, states that no derogation may be made from
the rights specified in certain articles of the Covenant: the inherent
right to life, with derogation from that right by the imposition of the
death penalty being allowed only in accordance with the conditions of
the Covenant;7 freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment or punishment;8 freedom from slavery, slave-trade,
and servitude;9 the right not to be imprisoned merely on the ground of
inability to fulfill a contractual obligation;' 0 the right not to be tried for
a criminal offense under retroactively applied law;"l the right to be rec-
ognized as a person before the law;' 2 and, freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion.'
3
Clearly, the drafters of the Covenant did not take lightly the possibil-
ity of departure from the rules and created both obstacles that may
have a restraining effect on States Parties and a bottom line comparable
to the one contained in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
on the Laws of War intended to guarantee a minimum standard of
human rights under all circumstances.' 4
5. Id para. 1 (emphasis added).
6. Id paras. 2 & 3.
7. Id art. 6.
8. Id art. 7.
9. Id art. 8, paras. 1 & 2.
10. Id art. 11.
11. Id art. 15.
12. Id art. 16.
13. Id art. 18.
14. Geneva convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, No. 970, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, No. 971, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Conven-
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II. "Article 4 States" before the Committee
The Committee has had an opportunity to consider the reports of
four States Parties that have availed themselves of the right to derogate
under article 4 and have notified the other States Parties accordingly.
In chronological order of their appearance before the Committee, these
four States are: the United Kingdom, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay.
Poland, the fifth State Party formally to invoke article 4, has not ap-
peared before the Committee since the proclamation of martial law on
December 12, 1981.15
A. United Kingdom
Upon ratification of the Covenant on May 20, 1976, the United
Kingdom notified the other States Parties of its intention to take and
continue measures derogating from its obligations under the Covenant
because of the "campaigns of organized terrorism related to Northern
Irish affairs" that, according to the notification, constituted a public
emergency within the meaning of article 4, paragraph 1.16 In their con-
sideration of the British reports,17 Committee members concentrated
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, No. 972, openedfor signature Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, No. 973, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
15. Poland had appeared before the Committee in October 1979 for the consideration of
its initial report.
16. The British notification read:
The Governments of the United Kingdom notify other State Parties to the present
Covenant, in accordance with article 4, of their intention to take and continue measures
derogating from their obligations under the Covenant.
There have been in the United Kingdom in recent years campaigns of organised
terrorism related to Northern Irish affairs which have manifested themselves in activi-
ties which have included murder, attempted murder, maiming, intimidation and violent
civil disturbances and in bombing and fire-raising which have resulted in death, injury
and widespread destruction of property. This situation constitutes a public emergency
within the meaning of article 4(1) of the Covenant. The emergency commenced prior to
the ratification by the United Kingdom of the Covenant and legislation has, from time
to time, been promulgated with regard to it.
The Governments of the United Kingdom have found it necessary (and in some cases
continue to find it necessary) to take powers, to the extent strictly required by the exi-
gencies of the situation, for the protection of life, for the protection of property and the
prevention of outbreaks of public disorder, and including the exercise of powers of
arrest and detention and exclusion. In so far as any of these measures is inconsistent
with the provisions of Articles 9, 10(2), 10(3), 12(1), 14, 17, 19(2), 21 or 22 of the Cove-
nant, the United Kingdom hereby derogates from its obligations under those
provisions.
Notification under Article 4(3) of the Covenant, in Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 1981, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/I, at 126
(1982).
17. The initial report of the U.K. is U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/l/Add.17 (1977). This report
The Human Rights Committee
on the following issues: the consequence of the reference to Northern
Irish affairs rather than to Northern Ireland for the territorial applica-
tion of the derogating measures; whether the situation in and related to
Northern Ireland threatened the life of the nation; the reasons and ex-
tent of the derogations undertaken; and whether there was a justifica-
tion for each derogation.' 8 As usual, the Committee presented no
formal conclusions, but it was clear from the debate that the members
expected a full explanation and justification by the representative of the
United Kingdom. The British representative made a comprehensive
reply which referred to the European Court of Human Rights' unani-
mous decision that a situation threatening the life of the nation ex-
isted.' 9 He also described in detail the derogations made and asserted
that none implicated the non-derogable rights enumerated in article 4,
paragraph 2.20
B. Chile
Following the coup d'etat of September 11, 1973, the military junta
of Chile exercised both executive and legislative powers and severely
limited the powers of the judiciary. On March 11, 1976, a state of siege
was declared which officially ended because it was not extended within
the required period of time. Subsequently, on September 7, 1976,
Chile's representative notified the States Parties through a letter to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations that a state of emergency pre-
vailed in that country.21
was supplemented by U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/l/Add.35 (1978). The U.K. has also filed an
initial report covering the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/
Add.39 (1979).
18. See 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 31, U.N. Doe. A/33/40 (1978) (summary of
Comm. considerations); 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 53, U.N. Doe. A/34/40 (1979)
(same); see also U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.67 (1978); U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.69 (1978); U.N.
Doe. CCPR/C/SR.70 (1978); U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.147 (1970); U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/
SR. 148 (1979); U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.149 (1979) (summary records of meetings).
19. Ireland v. U.K., [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
20. U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.70, paras. 28-33 (1978).
21. The Chilean notification read:
Notfication under article 4 of the Covenant
Chile signed the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ratified it on 10 Febru-
ary 1972. This Covenant entered into force internationally on [23] March 1976.
As you are aware, my country has been under a state of siege for reasons of internal
defence since 11 March 1976; the state of siege was legally proclaimed by Legislative
Decree No. 1,369.
The proclamation was made in accordance with the constitutional provisions con-
cerning state of siege, which have been in force since 1925, in view of the inescapable
duty of the government authorities to preserve public order and the fact that there con-
tinue to exist in Chile extremist seditious groups whose aim is to overthrow the estab-
lished Government.
As a consequence of the proclamation of the state of siege, the rights referred to in
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When considering the Chilean reports,22 several members of the
Committee expressed concern about the human rights situation in
Chile, and questioned the legality of the derogating measures under
article 4.23 The Chilean report mentioned the possibility offered by the
"internal legal order in Chile" of establishing an "exceptional legal reg-
imen required by [emergency] situations, consisting essentially of war,
civil commotion, latent subversion and public disaster." 24 The German
member "strongly doubted whether the concept of 'latent subversion'
...met the strict requirement of article 4 of the Covenant.' 25 The
Canadian member expressed concern about the Chilean government's
inability to define what legal order had been functioning in that coun-
try since the coup d'etat. He cited Chilean statements in other contexts
that were inconsistent with its formal notification.26 Other members
wondered whether there was a state of normality, and if not, why ex-
traordinary measures were required. They were not convinced by the
Chilean representative's reply that five and one-half years after the
chaotic events of September, 1973 the government could still continue
the state of exception or state of emergency.
The Committee's dissatisfaction with the Chilean reports was ex-
pressed in an unprecedented statement by the Chairman, on behalf of
the Committee, that "the information provided on the enjoyment of
human rights set forth in the Covenant and the impact of the state of
emergency was still insufficient. '27 The Chilean representative dis-
agreed with this statement, but promised a new report. To date, no
report has been submitted to the Committee.
28
C. Colombia
In its initial report, Colombia reported that it declared a state of
articles 9, 12, 13, 19 and 25 (b) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been
restricted in Chile.
Derogation from these rights is expressly authorized by article 4 (1) of the Covenant.
I am informing the other States Parties of the foregoing, through you, in accordance
with the provisions of article 4 (3) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/1, at 119 (1982).
22. See U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ll/Add.25 (1978), (replacing Add.15) (initial report of
Chile); U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/l/Add.40 (1979) (supplementary report).
23. 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 26, U.N. Do. A/34/40 (1978) (summary of
Comm. considerations); see also U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.127 (1979); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
SR.128 (1970); U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.130 (1979) (summary records of meetings).
24. U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/1/Add.25, at 12 (1978).
25. U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/ST.128, para. 17 (1979).
26. Id para. 40.
27. 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/34/40 (1978).
28. See U.N. Doe. A/36/594 Annex A (Agenda Item 12) (1981).
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siege on October 7, 1976.29 During his appearance before the Commit-
tee, however, the Colombian representative stated that "the state of
siege had actually been in effect for 30, or even 32 years" but that "the
institution had been refined to a point where assaults on public order
could be countered in a way compatible with the rule of law [sic]."' 30 In
fact, it appears that the state of exception has become the rule in that
country.
Members of the Committee, considering the report in July, 1980, ex-
pressed concern that the other States Parties had not been informed of
the existence of a state of seige. Moreover, it was unclear to what ex-
tent Colombia had taken measure of derogation. The British member
remarked that "a state of seige [was] not necessarily synonymous with a
'public emergency which threatened the life of the nation.'" He ques-
tioned whether Colombia was using its right under article 4 to justify
measures taken under the state of seige, such as the extension of mili-
tary jurisdiction "which did not accord the normal guarantees of due
process of law to the individual."' l
As an immediate result of the Committee's consideration of the ini-
tial report,32 on July 18, 1980, Colombia submitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations notification under article 4, paragraph
3.33 The notification states that "during the state of siege in Colombia,
29. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/I/Add.50, at 7 (1979).
30. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.226, para. 15 (1980); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.221, para. 8
(1980).
31. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/SR.221, paras. 29-30 (1980).
32. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 54, U.N.
Doc. A/35/40 (1980) (summary of Comm. considerations). See also U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
SR.221 (1980); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.223 (1980); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.226 (1980);
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.333 (1981) (summary records of meetings).
33. The Colombian notification read:
In accordance with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which Colombia is a party, I wish to inform you that the Government, by
Decree 2131 of 1976, declared that public order had been disturbed and that all of the
national territory was in a state of siege, the requirements of the Constitution having
been fulfilled, and that in the face of serious events that disturbed the public peace, it
had become necessary to adopt extraordinary measures within the framework of the
legal regime provided for in the National Constitution for such situations (art. 121 of
the National Constitution).
The events disturbing the public peace that led the President of the Republic to take
that decision are a matter of public knowledge. Under the stage of siege (art. 121 of the
National Constitution) the Government is empowered to suspend, for the duration of
the state of seige, those provisions that are incompatible with the maintenance and res-
toration of public order.
On many occasions the President of the Republic has informed the country of his
desire to terminate the state of siege when the necessary circumstances prevail.
It should be observed that, during the state of seige in Colombia, the institutional
order has remained unchanged, with the Congress and all public bodies functioning
normally. Similarly, constitutionality checks are carried out even in the case of meas-
139
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 9:133, 1982
the institutional order has remained unchanged, with the Congress and
all public bodies functioning normally. '34 This assertion confirms the
belief that the exception had become the rule. Nevertheless the ques-
tion concerning the nature of the state of seige under Colombian con-
stitutional law appears to have been rendered moot-the state of siege
was lifted on June 20, 1982, pursuant to Decree 1974 of June 9, 1982.
On October 8, 1982, the Permanent Representative of Colombia com-
municated this information to the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, in compliance with article 4, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
D. Uruguay
Although Uruguay's initial report was due in 1977, it was not sub-
mitted until February, 1982.35 The Committee considered the report in
April and July, 1982.36 Committee members were very critical of the
report. They considered the human rights situation in Uruguay fraught
with features unacceptable even by emergency standards. Specifically,
they noted that Uruguay's notification under article 4 did not meet the
requirements of that article, because the notification did not specify the
derogating measures, the extent of the limitations of the rights which
were being derogated from, and the reasons therefor. 37 Furthermore,
ures adopted under the exceptional regime established under article 121 of the National
Constitution. Moreover, public freedoms were fully respected during the most recent
elections, both the election of the President of the Republic and the election of members
of elective bodies.
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/l, at 120 (1982).
34. See id.
35. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.57 (1982).
36. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 58, U.N.
Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (summary of Comm. considerations). See also U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/
SR.355 (1982); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.356 (1982); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.357 (1982);
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.365 (1982); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.373 (1982) (summary records
of meetings).
37. The Uruguayan notification was contained in a telegram addressed to the Secretary-
General of the U.N. by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay dated June 28, 1979:
I have the honour to request that the requirement laid down in article 4(3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should be deemed to have been
formally fulfilled with regard to the existence and maintenance in Uruguay of a public
emergency as referred to in article 4(1).
This emergency situation, the nature and consequences of which match the descrip-
tion given in article 4, namely that they threaten the life of the nation, is a matter of
universal knowledge, and the present communication might thus appear superfluous in
so far as the provision of substantive information is concerned.
This issue has been the subject of countless official statements at both the regional
and the international level.
None the less, my Government wishes both to comply formally with the above-men-
tioned requirement and to reiterate that the emergency measures which it has taken,
and which comply strictly with the requirements of article 4(2), are designed precisely
to achieve genuine, effective and lasting protection of human rights, the observance and
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the emergency measures, established for an indefinite period,
amounted to permanent restrictions of human rights.
The Committee found that derogations from the non-derogable
rights had occurred frequently, notably from the right not to be sub-
jected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The
members also examined the extent to which the measures affected dero-
gable rights, considering that the rights enumerated in the Covenant
may not be suspended indefinitely. For example, with regard to the
suspension of article 25 providing for the participation of citizens in the
public affairs of their country, one of the members questioned when
general elections were expected to be held.
38
III. General Comment 5/13
Over the years, the Committee has attempted to sum up its experi-
ence with the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the
Covenant, and in monitioning the compliance or non-compliance by
States Parties with its provisions. It has done so through general rec-
ommendations that do not address any State Party specifically. In for-
mulating these general comments, the Committee 'relied upon the
power bestowed by article 4, paragraph 4 to "transmit its reports, and
such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States
Parties." At the time of this writing the Committee has submitted nine
general comments to the States Parties.39 The Committee has drafted
these comments to make its experience available "for the benefit of all
States Parties in order to promote their further implementation of the
Covenant; to draw their attention to insufficiencies disclosed by a large
number of reports," and "to suggest improvements in the reporting
procedure and to stimulate the activities of these States and interna-
promotion of which are the essence of our existence as an independent and sovereign
nation.
Notwithstanding what has been stated above, the information referred to in article
4(3) concerning the nature and duration of the emergency measures will be provided in
more detailed form when the report referred to in article 40 of the Covenant is submit-
ted, so that the scope and evolution of these measures can be fully understood.
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/1, at 127 (1982).
38. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.357, para. 19 (1982).
39. General comments 1/13 through 5/13 were adopted by the Committee on July 28,
1981 at its 311th meeting and deal with articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Covenant. The text is
contained in the Committee's 1981 Report. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex 7 at 107, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981). General comments
6/16 through 9/16 were adopted on July 27, 1982 and deal with articles 6, 7, 9, and 10 of the
Covenant. They are contained in the Committee's 1982 Report, Report of the Human
Rights Committee, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex 5 at 93, U.N. Doc. A/37/40
(1982).
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tional organizations in the promotion and protection of human
rights. '40 The Committee has availed itself of the widest possible com-
petence to review the implementation by States Parties, short of declar-
ing a specific State Party in default.
In General Comment 5/13 on article 4, the Committee, after recapit-
ulating the object and purpose of the article and the practices found in
some States Parties, concluded that
measures taken under article 4 are of an exceptional and temporary nature
and may only last as long as the life of the nation concerned is threatened
and that in times of emergency, the protection of human rights becomes all
the more important, particularly those rights from which no derogations can
be made.
4 1
This statement leaves no doubt about the strict manner in which the
article should be applied. By adding the final clause the Committee
admonishes States Parties not to relax their vigilance after availing
themselves of article 4 but rather to intensify their efforts to protect
human rights. One might compare this language to advice offered by a
physician to a seriously ill patient not to neglect himself but, on the
40. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex 7 at
107, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981).
41. 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex 7 at 110 (emphasis added). General comment
5/13 states
(1) Article 4 of the Covenant has posed a number of problems for the Committee
when considering reports from some States parties. When a public emergency which
threatens the life of a nation arises and it is officially proclaimed, a State party may
derogate from a number of rights to the extent strictly required by the situation. The
State party, however, may not derogate from certain specific rights and may not take
discriminatory measures on a number of grounds. The State party is also under an
obligation to inform the other State parties immediately, through the Secretary-Gen-
eral, of the derogations it has made including the reasons therefor and the date on
which the derogations are terminated.
(2) States parties have generally indicated the mechanism provided in their legal
systems for the declaration of a state of emergency and the applicable provisions of the
law governing derogations. However, in the case of a few States which had apparently
derogated from Covenant rights, it was unclear not only whether a state of emergency
had been officially declared but also whether rights from which the Covenant allows no
derogation had in fact not been derogated from and further whether the other States
parties had been informed of the derogations and of the reasons for the derogations.
(3) The Committee holds the view that measures taken under article 4 are of an
exceptional and temporary nature and may only last as long as the life of the nation
concerned is threatened and that in times of emergency, the protection of human rights
becomes all the more important, particularly those rights from which no derogations
can be made. The Committee also considers that it is equally important for States
parties, in times of public emergency, to inform the other States parties of the nature
and extent of the derogations they have made and of the reasons therefor and, further,
to fulfill their reporting obligations under article 40 of the Covenant by indicating the
nature and extent of each right derogated from together with the relevant
documentation.
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contrary, to make every effort to retain his human dignity and to make
an extra effort to regain his health.
Moreover, the Committee considered equally important that States
Parties, in times of public emergency, "inform other States Parties of
the nature and extent of the derogations they have made and of the
reasons therefore" and "fulfill their reporting obligations under article
40 of the Covenant by indicating the nature and extent of each right
derogated from together with the relevant documentation."
42
IV. The Need for a Special Procedure
Probably motivated by cases of public emergency occurring in States
Parties such as Poland, where martial law was proclaimed in Decem-
ber, 1981, El Salvador, where an actual state of civil war exists, and
Iran, where revolution continues-cases in which multiple violations of
the Covenant have been reported-the Committee decided to devote a
special debate to the problem of derogation and notification under arti-
cle 4 and its relation to the reporting system under article 40. The de-
bate took place in New York on March 22 and April 1-2, 1982.
43
At the beginning of the debate the Norwegian member submitted a
proposal for a special procedure before the Committee to deal with
public emergencies. This proposal was based on article 40 and general
comment 5/13. It read:
The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 40 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, requests the Secretary-
General, whenever a notification under article 4(3) has been made, imme-
diately to act as follows:
(a) To transmit the notification forthwith to the members of the
Human Rights Committee;
(b) To draw the attention of the State party concerned to general
comment 5/13, and in particular to the comment regarding the content
of the reporting obligations in this respect, and to inform it that the
Committee will decide at its next ordinary or extraordinary session
whether to request a special report under article 40(l)(b) and that
meanwhile the Committee will appreciate being kept currently in-
formed about the development of the emergency in so far as its affects
the implementation of the Covenant.44
Under article 4 a State Party is required to notify the other States Par-
ties through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Com-
42. Id (emphasis added).
43. See U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.334 (1982); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.349 (1982); U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.349 (1982) (summary records of meetings).
44. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.349, para. 16 (1982).
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mittee need not be notified formally by either the State Party or the
Secretary-General. Under the proposal, the Secretary-General would
do two things he is not explicitly required to do under the Covenant:
submit the proposal to the Committee and draw the attention of the
State Party concerned to General Comment 5/13. These acts may re-
sult in a special procedure whereby a special report could be requested
from the State Party at a regular or extraordinary session of the Com-
mittee. On the basis of that report the Committee would be able to
establish the extent to which article 4 had been implemented by the
State Party concerned. Adoption of this proposal would enable the
Committee promptly to assess the problem and require justification
from the State Party concerned.
Of course, the proposal cannot influence the official proclamation of
a state of emergency, should the case arise, and, consequently, the noti-
fication of the Secretary-General. Therefore a State Party could escape
the special procedure simply by not making a proclamation, but still
continue to limit the enjoyment of rights and freedoms. Such a tactic
would bespeak a State's preference for non-conformity with the Cove-
nant over public exposure through Committee procedures of its emer-
gency and its justification, or lack thereof. This outcome would be a
potentially adverse consequence of the procedure.
Nevertheless, the Norwegian proposal met with opposition on other
grounds. Objections to the procedure were raised by members from the
German Democratic Republic and from the United Kingdom.45 Their
arguments raised both procedural and substantive issues concerning
the Committee's role in monitoring emergency situations and its com-
petence in matters affecting the life of the nation. The German Demo-
cratic member stated his belief that "there was nothing in article 4 to
indicate or justify the assumption that States parties to the Covenant
had transferred any competence in such matters [affecting the life of a
nation] to. . .the Human Rights Committee." 46 The British member
concluded that "[i]t would not be wise for the Committee to establish
special procedures on the assumption that it had a special right to mon-
itor emergency situations. '47
On the whole, however, the majority of the members who spoke on
the subject agreed with the object and purpose of the proposal. The
Austrian member said that "such a procedure would provide a quick
45. One cannot help but relate the opposition to the fact that both Poland and the
United Kingdom have availed themselves of the rights under article 4.
46. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.344, para. 36 (1982).
47. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.351, para. 31 (1982).
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response to emergency situations and prevent possible cases of excks de
pouvoir by States parties. '48 The member from Senegal observed that
"[t]he action [the Committee] took should be exclusively within the
terms of article 40, paragraph 1 of which was sufficiently flexible and
general to allow the Committee to request reports from States parties
whenever an emergency situation arose. ' 49 The Canadian member
pointed out that: "under article 40(l)(b), States Parties had undertaken
to submit reports whenever the Committee so requested. Thus, the
Committee had the power to request a report at any stage."'50 Agreeing
with this point, the member from the Federal Republic of Germany
added that the Committee's decision on the periodicity of reporting was
simply not sufficient to enable it to deal effectively with emergency situ-
ations.5' Other members, including those from Mauritius, Tunisia,
Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Yugoslavia, welcomed the debate on the pro-
posal, but emphasized the need for careful study of its implications.
Ultimately, the Committee deferred a decision on the proposal, which
had not been acted upon as of March, 1983.
V. Conclusion
A study of the Committee's consideration of States Parties' reports
indicates that the Committee makes high demands on States Parties
respecting the implementation of article 4. The Committee considers
itself empowered to request and review all available information on
states of public emergency and expects States Parties fully to justify any
derogating measures. Although it recognizes a State Party's discretion
to determine whether a situation warrants the suspension of certain
rights, it will question the grounds for application of a State Party's
emergency legislation when the crisis does not appear to meet the Cov-
enant's standard for a "public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation. ' 52 The Committee will also question the need for continuing a
state of exception, especially if the public emergency occurred in the
distant past and the derogating measures appear to have been perpetu-
ated for convenience.5 3 The temporary character of the derogating
measures must at all times be clear. It is not sufficient that a State Party
establish a "state of siege" to qualify for applicability of article 4. The
48. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.349, para. 20 (1982).
49. Id. para. 22.
50. Id. para. 26.
51. Id para. 28.
52. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (case of Chile).
53. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (case of Colombia).
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State claiming a public emergency must substantiate its claim by dem-
onstrating that the life of the nation really is at stake.
54
The Committee will check the derogating measures against the
enumeration of non-derogable rights in article 4, paragraph 2. At the
same time it will examine the suspension of derogable rights and check
the suspension against article 4, paragraph 1, to see that it is strictly
required, not inconsistent with bther obligations, non-discriminatory,
and of apparently temporary duration.5 5 Finally, the Committee will
demand that a State Party availing itself of the right of derogation scru-
pulously fulfill the obligations of article 4, paragraph 3, informing the
other States Parties of all the provisions from which it has derogated
and the reasons for such derogation.
54. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (case of U.K.).
55. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (case of Uruguay).
Vol. 9:133, 1982
